A look at the way we look at Complex Networks Robustness and Resilience by de Morais, Ulisses Lacerda & Antunes, Luis
 Working paper 
 
A look at the way we look at Complex 
Networks’ Robustness and Resilience 
Doctoral Program in Complexity Sciences, ISCTE / FCUL 
 
Ulisses Lacerda de Morais 
ISTA, ISCTE University Institute of Lisbon 
 
Luis Antunes 
GUESS, LabMAg University of Lisbon 
 
June 19th, 2017 (v0.1) 
 
 
Abstract 
This article offers a brief overview of the current research topics concerning strategies to 
mitigate the adverse effects of perturbations in complex networks. It addresses the issue of 
an unclear use of Robustness and Resilience terminology and proposes a common 
interdisciplinary framework for comparing strategies across different fields. It concludes 
with a high-level discussion of existing challenges and suggestions for future research. 
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Introduction 
In the Network Sciences there is substantial literature on the study of how perturbations 
affect the topology and functionality of complex networks. As the field itself, this is a highly 
interdisciplinary topic from applications varying across disciplines and scales, from genes 
interaction to prevention of epidemics, from major depression to financial and 
environmental collapse. 
Despite the diversity of topics, there is a communal interest of the studies in the past few 
decades on strategies to ensure the networks’ survivability. Moreover, the majority of the 
research can be further categorized under three streams of defensive strategies against 
perturbations: resistance, adaptability and anticipation. 
Resistance strategies mainly deal with fine tuning the networks’ features that minimize the 
propagation of the perturbations’ adverse effects; be these within [5] [8] or across networks 
[3] [9]. Structural optimization is a recurrent theme in such studies [4, p.145] [5] [7] as it is 
well recognized that, depending on the type of perturbation (random or targeted), some 
topologies carry advantages over others [4, p.120] [7] [8] [10]. 
Adaptability strategies comprise fostering the characteristics that maximize recovery (or 
regeneration) rate. The effectiveness of these methods might be contingent on edges’ 
rewiring costs or level of diversity among nodes as well as early-detection ex post [2], e.g.: 
through continuous monitoring [1] or inbuilt high sensitivity [12]. 
Anticipation strategies evidently refers to prevention via prediction or early-detection ex 
ante. The real-world applicability of this stream remains unclear as the debate over the 
predictability of complex networks’ behavior matures [2]. 
Due to this subject’s multidisciplinary, there is not yet a consensus about the use of 
terminology and typology, the literature is highly contextual and surrounded by ambiguity 
arising from different scientific frameworks. This article looks at this matter and proposes 
the adoption of a reconciliation method for the comparison of such survival strategies 
across disciplines. 
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Robustness versus Resilience 
Robustness and Resilience concepts are frequently used interchangeably or contextually 
within the literature, reason why these terms were intentionally avoided up to this point of 
the discourse. However, there is arguably much to gain by formalizing the distinction 
between these two terms in a generic enough fashion that could be later used to reconcile 
different fields’ viewpoints. 
In this regard, Robustness can be broadly defined as a network’s capacity to resist or deter 
the propagation of adverse effects or loss of functionality. This capacity could be embedded 
in the network’s topology (e.g.: scale-free networks against random failures [4, p.120] [5]), 
could be an innate feature of its components (e.g.: nodes homogeneity [2]), or could even 
be achieved through external intervention (e.g.: immunization [4, p.170]). 
In contrast, Resilience can be generically defined as a network’s capacity to recover from or 
adapt to adverse effects or loss of functionality. No distinction needed for the source of this 
capacity, as it could also be, for instance, due to engineered features (e.g.: autonomous 
monitoring layer [1] [6]) or the networks’ self-organized structure (e.g.: modularity [2]). 
Now it is possible to establish the link between Robustness and Resilience capacities (and 
measurements) to Resistance and Adaptability defensive strategies, respectively. 
Although most networks will present some degree of both capacities, a clear distinction is 
especially relevant for the comparison of experiments and exchange of lessons learned 
across different disciplines. 
Suggestion of strategies comparison framework 
In this regard, the several defensive strategies proposed in the complex networks body of 
knowledge could be defined over three axes’ parameters: level of Robustness after the 
strategies’ implementation, the analogous level of Resilience and, lastly, the elevation 
based on the strategies’ effectiveness against perturbations (random, targeted, sustained, 
combined and so on). 
5 
A look at the way we look at Complex Networks’ Robustness and Resilience 
Noticeably, for a given type of network configuration, these axes create a three dimensional 
space, where each strategy has a correspondent coordinate and thus, with sufficient points, 
a fitness landscape can be derived. It is worth adding that time is a fourth dimension that 
could be visualized via computational simulation to investigate the possibility of an adaptive 
landscape (particularly relevant for social networks). This framework excludes Anticipation 
strategies as their precise impact over the parameters is not currently measurable. 
To illustrate this idea of interdisciplinary gains, two distinct undirected networks with 100 
nodes were randomly generated1 — a scale-free based on the Barabasi-Albert (BA) model 
[14] with preferential attachment power parameter was set to 2 with 4 nodes added each 
time step; and a random graph generated according to the Erdos-Renyi (ER) model [15] with 
1/10 of edge probability. 
Hypothetically, each of these networks could be the object of study by two distinct fields, 
say A and B respectively, each testing its own defensive strategy to increase their networks’ 
resistance against different attack strategies aiming to weaken their networks’ connectivity. 
                                                          
1 The ‘igraph R package’ (http://igraph.org/r/) was used to generate the networks with RNG seed set to 101. 
Scale-free network as per BA-model. 
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Field A’s strategy is to randomly rewire half of its BA network’s edges, while field B is 
creating edges between all ER network’s nodes that are two hops afar from each other 
(neighboring). 
The networks properties are shown in the table below for each of the defensive strategies: 
Original edges 
average 
degree 
degree 
centrality 
closeness 
average 
path 
modularity2 
(walktrap cluster) 
diameter betweenness transitivity 
BA 390 7.8 0.6585859 0.5756717 1.98101 0.160572 3 0.2878281 0.1316674 
ER 501 10.02 0.07050505 0.1159794 2.241818 0.2079693 4 0.02595136 0.0980234 
          
Rewired edges 
average 
degree 
degree 
centrality 
closeness 
average 
path 
Modularity3 
(walktrap cluster) 
diameter betweenness transitivity 
BA2 390 7.8 0.2545455 0.3140184 2.363434 0.2402696 4 0.128781 0.1271663 
ER2 501 10.02 0.09070707 0.1445627 2.233939 0.2419871 4 0.03502448 0.1104663 
          
Neighbored edges 
average 
degree 
degree 
centrality 
closeness 
average 
path 
modularity3 
(walktrap cluster) 
diameter betweenness transitivity 
BA3 4654 93.08 0.05979798 0.1069297 1.059798 0.01280322 2 0.0002614505 0.9507519 
ER3 3266 65.02 0.1987879 0.2529746 1.340202 0.05507451 2 0.003247331 0.7036844 
 
                                                          
2 Modularity determined based on walktrap community finding algorithm which assumes that short random 
walks tend to stay in the same community. 
Random graph as per ER-model. 
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Next, both networks were subjected to four node percolation sustained attack strategies3, 
namely: random removal, targeted on nodes with highest betweenness centrality, targeted 
on nodes with the highest impact closeness (labelled “degree”), and a combination of 
random and targeted on betweenness (labelled “cascading”). 
                                                          
3 The ‘NetSwam R package’ algorithm (https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=NetSwan) was used to run the 
robustness and resilience tests. 
Original BA network’s connectivity loss per increasing fraction of nodes removed 
Original ER network’s connectivity loss per increasing fraction of nodes removed 
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Field A’s results after applying rewiring strategy: 
 
Field B’s results after applying neighboring strategy: 
 
 
Rewired BA network’s connectivity loss per increasing fraction of nodes removed 
Neighbored ER network’s connectivity loss per increasing fraction of nodes removed 
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Assuming both fields share a common method to compare their defense strategies and 
apply the analogous in each other’s areas, and taking the decrease in the connectivity loss 
rate as a measure of strategies’ effectiveness, then field A could benefit from applying B’s 
strategy in its BA network. Conversely, B could learn that A’s rewiring strategy is ineffective 
for its ER network. 
  
Neighbored BA network’s connectivity loss per increasing fraction of nodes removed 
Rewired ER network’s connectivity loss per increasing fraction of nodes removed 
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Discussion 
A bird's-eye view on the study of strategies to mitigate the adverse effects of random 
perturbations (failures) or targeted ones (attacks) reveals that there has been a significant 
advances in the body of work in the last decade, the focus is gradually shifting from simple 
one-layered networks with homogeneous nodes (from 60’s to 80’s), to multi-layered or 
interdependent dynamic networks with heterogeneous nodes capable to change state, 
learn and make local decisions on reassembling or replacement (80’s onwards) [2] [3] [11]. 
Percolation theory and biggest connected component remain the most popular methods to 
test a network’s resistance to disintegration [5] or cascading failures [6] [7]. However, 
progresses on studies of criticality [2], feedback loops [11] and adaptive capacity [12] are 
becoming increasingly more instrumental to improve our knowledge. 
Notwithstanding, in what regards the real-world applicability and accuracy of these 
strategies there is much to consider. A conspicuous complication is the well observed 
tradeoff between Resilience and Robustness [4, p.145] [11] [12], particularly for strategies 
based on structure or responsiveness rate. 
Structural optimization assumes that either network design or punctual intervention is 
possible, however reassembling costs and incomplete data create practical impediments to 
implementation [5] [13]. Similarly, responsiveness rate depends on the efficient flow of 
information across the network [12], whereas the perturbation or proximity to the critical 
threshold can themselves promote sluggishness on this flow [2], thus rendering the strategy 
ineffective. 
Although a complete discussion is beyond our scope here, a fundamental inquire on drafting 
these strategies is: can we prevent what we cannot predict? This is a pertinent question for 
all kinds of defensive strategies. Complex networks usually contain a large degree of 
nonlinearity [2], also effective strategies cannot consider the network in isolation, for 
instance, it is demonstrated that interdependence with other networks can increase 
structural vulnerability [3] [9]. 
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By definition, all research streams in this subject presume some level of prediction, from 
local impact or single-layered percolation (resistance strategies) to independent 
propagation or abundancy of resources (adaptability) to predictability itself (anticipation). 
For dynamic or adaptive networks, Robustness (or Fragility) can be acquired with time, 
particularly in the presence of feedback loops [11]. In such cases preserving structure is 
suboptimal as the priority might be to maintain functionality by replacing removed nodes 
or edges, developing immunity after contagion, fast regeneration and etc. 
Furthermore, Robustness and Resilience are not always desirable traits [12], it drastically 
depends on the circumstances. When the dynamics aspects are accounted for, even against 
random failures, robust scale-free complex networks might be susceptible to abrupt regime 
shifts as the entire systems could be self-organizing towards critically [2] [11]. 
Another factor to contemplate is that nodes may not be evenly exposed to perturbations, 
for example, nodes with a highest betweenness centrality could be more likely to fail due 
to cumulative stress [7] [9], which smudges the line between targeted and random 
perturbation. 
In conclusion, answering the original question is not straightforward, what outlines the 
need for more complementarity across fields, since costly prevention cannot be incidental. 
Suggestion for future research 
Building on the previous suggestion, a few interesting questions to answer in future works 
are, namely: what are the most effective survival strategies for complex networks? How 
they interplay with adversary networks? Could Resilience or Robustness capacity be built in 
separate layers as a control mechanism? If so, how effective is this strategy? 
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